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The  present  paper  analyzes  the  incentives  individual  members  of  society  face  to 
contribute to a nation’s efforts in controlling corruption. A Principal-Agent model is constructed, 
leading to the following results. First, although individual agents do have an interest in devoting 
a portion of their resources to the nation’s control effort, the opportunity cost of the effort and a 
free rider problem bocks the spontaneous provision of individual support to corruption control.  
Second, to cope with those incentives, a new welfare improving mechanism is proposed, which 
aligns individual incentives with those of society at no extra cost to the government.  
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  The efficient use of public resources is one of the fundamental factors underlying the distinct 
development  paths  forged  by  nations  that  were  initially  at  a  comparable  stage  of  technological 
development.  To  be  sure,  investments  in  unfinished  projects,  waste,  and  the  diversion  and 
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mismanagement  of  public  resources  have  a  devastating  effect  not  only  on  a  country's  public 
accounts  but  also  on  its  GDP  growth  rate.
1  Mauro  (1995),  for  example,  presents  a  67-country 
econometric  analysis,  in  which  “corruption  is  found  to  lower  investment,  thereby  lowering 
economic growth”.  Similarly, Habib (2002) provides an 89-country econometric analysis which 
concludes  that  corruption  reduces  foreign  direct  investment  as  well.  A  specific  country  study 
presented in Bugarin and Ellery Jr. (2003) suggests that Brazil wasted approximately 20% of its 
gross capital accumulation in the last five decades of the 20
th century.  
  The  high  social  cost  associated  with  the  inefficient  use  of  public  resources  has  driven 
societies around the world to assume a far more active role in controlling public resources and in 
demanding punishment of those individuals involved in corruption and the diversion of resources. 
To cite a landmark example, the impeachment of former Brazilian President Fernando Collor de 
Mello in 1992
2, which was only made possible by the significant pressure exerted by society
3, 
represented a milestone in the effort to raise social awareness in that country.  
Civil society’s participation in detecting and monitoring the diversion of public resources is 
of great importance to a country. First, because it represents a form of civic action that fosters a 
spirit of national unity centered on the common good. Second, because it carries the potential of 
frightening corrupt individuals, who face the risk of punishment, and, in this way, deters them from 
engaging in illicit activities. 
                                                            
1 There is no theoretical unanimity about the effects of corruption on economic development. One trend of the literature 
highlights the inefficiency-reduction role of corruption as it allows for a Coasian negotiation between the bureaucrat 
who owns the property rights of public resources and private agents that can benefit from those resources. In a society 
dominated by a rigid bureaucracy such negotiation may lead to a second best instead of a third best allocation. In 
Huntington (1968)’s words: “In terms of economic growth, the only thing worse than a society with a rigid, over-
centralized, dishonest bureaucracy is one with a rigid, over-centralized, honest bureaucracy”.  A second trend of the 
literature  notices  the  symbiotic  relationship  that  may  arise  between  corruption  and  the  bureaucratic  structure  and 
concludes that instead of reducing the inefficiency of a rigid bureaucracy, corruption may in fact induce such rigidity, so 
that the bureaucrat can benefit from the resulting negotiation process. In that case corruption reduces economic growth 
by keeping an inefficient bureaucracy. Clearly, the authors of this article agree with this last analysis of the effects of 
corruption. For an excellent review of that literature see Bardhan (1997).   
2 “In May of 1992, Brazilian President Fernando Collor was accused by his own brother, Pedro, of leading a broad 
corruption network” (Hinohosa & Perez-Linan, 2002). This accusation led to his final impeachment in December of that 
year. 
3 “On September 29, 1992, the chamber of deputies voted 343-34 to impeach Fernando Collor, while more than 100,000 
people demonstrated against the president in front of Congress” (Hinohosa & Perez-Linan, 2002). See also Ramalho 
(2004). 3 
Social involvement by average citizens, however, requires dedication and resources, and, 
moreover, it also competes with their everyday activities such as work and leisure. Given the cost of 
devoting oneself to social control, citizens have a natural tendency to delegate the responsibility for 
controlling the Public Administration to the government. Therefore, in the current context, it may be 
the case that the Federal Government is not taking advantage of the effort civil society might well be 
willing to invest in controlling the public administration, were it not for the high cost of this activity. 
The purpose of the present article is to study the incentives society faces with respect to its 
participation in the control of public expenditures, and to determine how this participation can be 
promoted. The second section sets forth the basic ideas of the proposed model. As a benchmark for 
future comparisons, section 3 develops and solves the optimization problem of an agent who is 
unaware of his potential for participating in the collective control effort. The following section 
determines the optimal choice for an agent when he recognizes his role in the control process, 
although here he receives no government encouragement to become involved. This case highlights 
the fact that there are limited incentives for civil society to exercise a significant role, to the extent 
that a natural tendency exists for society to delegate all of the responsibility for control to the 
government bodies. Recognizing the reduced stimulus for spontaneous social involvement, section 5 
analyzes an alternative mechanism that induces civil society to invest its own resources in control 
without resulting in any additional cost to the State. Section 6 reviews the theory of Legislative 
oversight in the light of the proposed incentive mechanism. The following section compares that 
mechanism with others that are actually in use or have been proposed in order to avert behavior that 
will be harmful to society, and concludes that if incentives are set properly then individuals’ private 
effort can be used in large scale to control public expenditure. Finally, section 8 concludes the study. 
 
 
2. Basic Ideas of the Model 
 
All citizens make use of the public goods and services provided by the State and, as a result, 
expect the State to use its resources in an efficient and competent manner in order to provide, within 
the established budgetary constraints, the largest possible volume of goods and services. However, 
considering the problem of incentives associated with the Public Administration, there occurs large-4 
scale  waste  of  resources,  squandered  through  fraud,  overcharging,  corruption,  and  unfinished 
projects. 
Citizens are aware of that waste, feel victimized by it, and have a natural inclination to 
participate in the control of the Public Administration, denouncing the irregularities they uncover. 
However, for this contribution to be truly effective, it is essential that these agents devote time and 
effort to the control process. On the other hand, there are costs to the agents for devoting time and 
effort to safeguarding the public assets, given that they could use the same resources to obtain a 
higher private return whether by working more or making better use of their leisure time. This 
phenomenon is known as the “opportunity cost” of control, which requires giving up individual 
return in order to control wasting public goods. 
Thus, an impasse emerges: if the expected social return for the time devoted to control is 
very low in comparison to the private return that the agent obtains when he devotes himself to his 
work or leisure activities, his preference will be to transfer all the responsibility for the control of 
the Public Administration to the government. 
Moreover, there is a free rider problem in which an agent who expects that his colleague will 
devote time and effort to control ends up relying on the other individual without contributing to the 
general control effort. However, if everyone thinks along those same lines, nobody contributes to 
the control process. This is a quite common phenomenon in the economics of the public sector, 
which explains why the voluntary provision of public goods tends to generate a quantity of goods 
that is much lower than the socially optimal one.  
Both of the problems enumerated above, the opportunity cost of control and the free rider 
problem, drive civil society to distance itself from the control effort, leaving the responsibility for 
the control of the public administration exclusively in the hands of the formal control institutions. 
To resolve this problem and actually be able to count on society's participation in the control effort, 
incentive mechanisms must be created that, in some way, compensate the civil organizations for 
their efforts. 
A possible mechanism proposed in this article consists in awarding financial compensation 
to institutions that prove to be instrumental in the recovery of diverted public resources. In this case, 5 
a portion of the recovered resources would be used for compensation, resulting in no cost to the 
government.  It is important to stress that this does not involve the injudicious distribution of scarce 
public resources, which would be highly inappropriate, particularly given the current context in 
which  most  governments  have  endeavored  to  remain  within  tight  and  responsible  budgetary 
constraints.  To  the  contrary,  the  idea  is  to  create  more  latitude  within  the  existing  budgetary 
constraints by introducing a mechanism that would allow for the recovery of those resources that 
would otherwise be irrevocably lost. The compensation awarded to those institutions that made 
possible the  recovery of those resources would  be derived in whole, and  exclusively,  from  the 
recovered amount.
4 Note furthermore that the reward to the instrumental agent could be made in 
kind but also as tax credits, for example, or other mechanisms that would not necessarily imply 




3. The Basic Model and the Representative Agent's Decision without Social Involvement 
 
The Government 
The government has at its disposal a budget in the amount of B monetary units that is to be 
used to provide public goods and services to society. However, public administrators may divert 
parts of budget B using several mechanisms such as overcharging, ghost contracts, illicit transfers, 
etc. Let d be a percentage of the total budget that is diverted. Thus, only the amount (1-d)B is 
actually converted into public goods and services that generate a return to society. The value dB 
corresponds to the amount of the public budget that is lost. 
  
                                                            
4  In  this  study,  the  concept  “recovered  amount”  is  broad,  encompassing  resources  that  are  detected  even  before 
becoming effectively diverted.  
5 The authors are grateful to Mirta Bugarin for this insight.  6 
The Public Control Institutions 
  The role of the public control institutions is to detect
6 the diversion dB. However, the control 
process does not always allow for the identification of the diverted resources in time to recover the 
lost amount. This model estimates that the official bodies are able to recover the diverted amount 
with a probability p0Î[0,1]. The probability p0 is an exogenous parameter of the model and, to a 
certain degree, represents the level of development of the national control system: the larger p0 is, 
the more efficient the control bodies are, insofar as they will be able to provide for the recovery of 
the diverted resources with greater frequency. 
 
Society  
Society  is  modeled  by  a  representative  agent,  who  derives  satisfaction  from  three  basic 
activities: the consumption of private goods (clothing, food, semidurable and durable goods, etc.), 
leisure (sports, the arts, performances, rest, etc.), and the consumption of the goods and services 
provided by the State (healthcare, education, social security, national security, law enforcement, 
etc.). In the pages that follow, public goods are referred to generically as the entire range of goods 
and  services  provided  by  the  State,  even  though  from  the  standpoint  of  economic  theory  this 
designation is not wholly accurate.
7  
Thus, one can characterize the agent's utility as a function U(c, l, b), in which c corresponds 
to private consumption, l corresponds to leisure time, and b corresponds to the consumption of 
public  goods.  This  model  assume  b=(1-d)B/n,  in  which  n  is  the  total  population.  Hence,  the 
consumption  of  public  goods  for  a  representative  agent  is  measured  in  terms  of  per-capita 
consumption of the effectively implemented budget. 
                                                            
6 To be sure, the duties of the official control bodies are far more complex, ranging from the prevention of diversions, 
whenever possible, to the detection and recovery of the diverted resources. This model focuses on the task of detecting 
the diversion of resources; however, section 8 shows that an additional function of the proposed model is a long-term 
reduction in the diversion of resources, meaning that it has a preventive effect. 
7 In economic theory, a pure public good is any good having two basic characteristics, non-exclusion (the costs to 
exclude an agent from consuming that good are extremely elevated) and non-rivalry (the consumption of that good by 
an agent does not affect its consumption by other agents), regardless of who is responsible for providing the good. Thus, 
national defense is a typical example of a pure public good while education is a publicly provided private good.  7 
The agent is endowed with a unit of time and must decide how to allocate it among three 
basic  activities:  work,  leisure,  and  control.  Work  provides  income  that  is  used  to  purchase  the 
agent's private consumption. Leisure provides no income; however, the time devoted to that activity 
generates  satisfaction  for  the  agent.  Finally,  the  time  devoted  to  control  can  contribute  to  the 
recovery of the diverted resources, so that the agent receives a larger offering of the public goods 
provided by the State. The agent may or may not recognize the strategic opportunity of contributing 
to the nation’s control effort. This first basic model assumes that the agent does not recognize that 
opportunity and ascribes all the responsibility for the control of the public administration to the 
official institutions. In the next sections, that hypothesis will be relaxed. 
 
The Agent Maximization Problem  
The utility function for the agent is presented more precisely below. 
U(c, l, b)= a u(c) + b v(l) + g [p0w(b) + (1- p0) w((1- d)b)] 
Therefore, it is assumed that agent's utility is additively separable in private consumption, 
leisure,  and  the  consumption  of  public  goods.  The  function  u  represents  the  specific  utility 
associated  with  the  consumption  of  private  goods  (c);  the  function  v  computes  the  satisfaction 
associated with leisure (l), and the function w expresses the utility derived from the (individual) 
consumption public goods. Note that the consumption of public goods is a random variable that 
takes the value b with a probability p0(when the diverted resources are recovered), and takes the 
value (1- d)b with a probability 1- p0  (when those resources are not recovered). It is for that reason 
that  the  expected  value  of  the  satisfaction  derived  from  the  consumption  of  public  goods  is 
considered in the utility equation. The present model assumes that the functions u and v and w are 
strictly increasing, concave, and differentiable, and that in addition, u and v are strictly concave; 
thus, the greater the consumption of private goods, leisure time, and the consumption of public 
goods,  the  greater  the  agent's  satisfaction;  however,  the  added  satisfaction  derived  from  each 
additional unit of private consumption or leisure decreases, to the extent that the agent already 
benefits from a large quantity of that consumption or amount of leisure time. 8 
Finally, the positive parameters a, b, and g (where a+b+g=1) represent the relative weight 
the satisfaction derived from each of the different activities has in the agent's utility function. Thus, 
if a is significantly large in comparison to the other parameters, the agent will give more value to 
the  consumption  of  private  goods,  while  attaching  relatively  less  value  to  leisure  and  the 
consumption of public goods. Similarly, if g is significantly large, the agent will ascribe more value 
to  the  consumption  of  goods  and  services  provided  by  the  State  and,  as  a  consequence,  could 
potentially concern himself more with the losses resulting from the unrecovered diverted resources. 
 
When the agent does not believe that he can contribute to the government's control effort, his 
decisions on how to allocate his time will be reduced to choosing how much time to devote to work 
and how much to leisure. Thus, the agent's maximization problem can be written as follows. 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] b w b w l v c u
l h
d p p g b a - - + + + 1 ) 1 ( 0 0
, max   P1 
s.t.   h+l £ 1                (1) 
        c £ sh                  (2) 
 
Restriction (1) in the maximization problem states that the agent in endowed with one unit of 
time (which can be considered as the total number of available hours) that can be allocated among 
work and leisure activities. The parameter s in restriction (2) is the wage rate, so that if the agent 
devotes h units of time to work, he will warrant a total wage sh that may then be applied towards his 
private consumption. 
 
The Agent's Optimal Choice 
Given  that  the  functions  u  and  v  are  strictly  increasing,  the  restrictions  (1)  and  (2)  are 
binding.  Therefore,  one  can  replace  l  with  1-h  and  c  with  sh,  thereby  converting  the  original 
problem into a concave program in a single variable. The first-order conditions yield the following 
solution.  9 
sa u¢(sh) = b v¢(1- h)    and    l = 1- h  (3) 
The solution to the first equation corresponds to the optimal value h, which generates the optimal 
value  l  for  the  second  equation.  Note  that  the  greater  the  satisfaction  generated  by  private 
consumption (a)  vis-à-vis leisure (b), the more time the agent will devote to work. By the same 
token, the greater the relative satisfaction derived from leisure activities, the more time that will be 
devoted to those activities. 
Example 
In order to present a closed-form expression for the problem's solution, assume that the 
utilities u and v take the usual logarithmic form: u(c)=log(c) and v(l)=log(l). Therefore, the optimal 
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4. The Agent's Decision with Social Involvement but Without Incentives 
 
Social Involvement  
The model presented in the previous section assumes that the representative agent delegates 
exclusive responsibility for controlling the public administration to the public institutions. However, 
the diverted public resources reduce the agent's utility by reducing the per-capita value of b to 
(1-d)b. Nonetheless, if the agent contributes to the effort to increase the probability of recovery of 
the diverted resources, he will increase his own utility. 
This section assumes that the agent can affect the probability of recovery of the diverted 
resources if he invests a portion of his time in control. More specifically, let t be the time the agent 
devotes to  control.  The  agent,  then,  will  be instrumental in bringing to  light the  diversion  and 
recovering the public resources with probability  ( ) [ ] 1 , 0 , 0 Î t p p , where p  is a concave function 
satisfying the following conditions: 10 
(i)  ( ) [ ] [ ] [ ] 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 0 0 Î " Î " - Î t t p p p p  

























Condition (i) simply states that p is an incremental probability, i.e., the total probability of 
recovering  diverted  public  resources  when  there  is  social  involvement  is  ( ) [ ] 1 , 0 , 0 0 Î + t p p p . 
Condition (ii) states that if the agent does not dedicate any effort into social control, the probability 
of recovering diverted resources does not change:  ( ) 0 0 0 0 , p p p p = + . Condition (iii) states that the 
more efficient are the public authorities (the larger p0), the lower the probability the agent will be 
instrumental.  Condition (iv) states that the more time the agent dedicates to social control, the 
higher the probability he becomes instrumental in recovering diverted resources. Finally, condition 
(v) captures the idea of substitutability of public and private effort: the more efficient the public 
authorities, the lower the marginal effect of private effort. 
 
The New Problem of the Agent 
When  the  agent  recognizes  the  strategic  opportunity  of  social  involvement,  the  problem 
becomes the allocation of time among three activities: work, leisure, and social control. The new 
formal problem is presented below.   
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] b w t b w t l v c u
t l h
d p p p p p p g b a - + - + + + + 1 , 1 , 0 0 0 0
, , max   P2 
s.t.   h+l+t £ 1                (4) 
        c £ sh                  (5) 
 11 
The restrictions of this problem are the same as in the previous problem, although care must 
be taken to include the time t expended on control in equation (4). 
Once again, on the basis of the monotonicity properties of the functions u, v, and now p, the 
restrictions will be binding. However, as opposed to the previous problem, it is not possible to 
ensure the existence of an interior solution: 0 < h, l, t < 1. In fact, we argue in the next section that, 
in general, the solution to the problem will involve no spontaneous provision of social, control, i.e., 
t=0. 
 
The Diminutive Likelihood of Spontaneous Provision of Social Control  
If  an  interior  solution  exists,  then  we  can  solve  for  the  first-order  conditions.  Let 
Dw(b)=w(b)-w((1-d)b), then these conditions imply: 
 
l h t - - =1                     (6) 
( ) ( ) ( ) b w t
t
sh u s D
¶
¶
= ¢ , 0 p
p
g a                (7) 





= ¢ , 0 p
p
g b                 (8) 
   
Note that it follows from equations (7) and (8) that  ( ) ( ) l v sh u s ¢ = ¢ b a , which corresponds to 
the same expression as in the previous solution (3), with the difference now that the restriction 
h+l=1 is no longer valid.  
It follows from the above equations and from condition (v) that the higher the efficiency of 
the official control bodies (p0), the less stimulus society will have to invest its time in social control. 
Hence, the model suggests that society's participation in the control efforts will decrease as the 
formal institutions become more effective. Moreover, the lower the civil agent's capability, which is 







), the lower his incentive to participate in social control. Suppose, for example, that v¢ is 






 is 12 
small, condition (8) will never be satisfied
8. The fact that one does not usually observe high levels of 
involvement of society in the social control effort suggests that this is the case, as illustrated in the 




In order to illustrate the previous argument, consider the closed form u(c)=log(c), v(l)=log(l) 






k t = , where k < p0(1-p0) is a constant that measures the agent's competence in 
uncovering illicit diversions. Then, the greater k is, the more "productive” the agent will be, insofar 
as there will be a greater probability of recovering the diverted resources. On the other hand, as 
discussed above, the larger p0, the lower the probability the agent will be instrumental. Note that 
because of the restriction imposed on parameter k, society can never have total certainty that the 
diverted resources will be recovered, even if the agent devotes all of his time to control: p0+p(1)<1. 
Then, conditions (6), (7), and (8) produce the following solution to the problem: 
( ) ( )
( )


















ap 0 0 0 1 , ,   (9) 
 
   Therefore, for this solution to work it must be the case that: 
p0(a+b)<gkDw(b)  (10) 
 
Recall that Dw(b)=w(b)-w((1-d)b) corresponds to the gain obtained by the agent from the 
recovery of the diverted sum dB. Given that b=B/n, the right hand side of (10) is likely to be very 
small. Moreover, if g is small compared to a+b, meaning that the agent cares more about private 
consumption and leisure than about public goods, and if the effectiveness of the agent’s effort (the 
                                                            










, 0  for all tÎ[0,1]. 13 
parameter  k)  is  reduced,  then  (10)  is  likely  not  to  occur,  so  that  there  will  be no  spontaneous 
provision of social control. 
Note, further, that if one were to extrapolate a larger number of private agents for the basic 
model, a free rider problem would emerge. In the context of this analysis, the free rider problem can 
be described as follows: if there are several agents, one of them will make use of the benefits (the 
recovery of diverted resources) deriving from the efforts of the others (the time invested in social 
control) without, however, having to devote any of his time to that activity; in other words, an agent 
can free ride on the effort of the others. Consequently, if an agent expects that others will devote 
themselves  to  social  control,  he  will  choose  t=0.  However,  if  all  agents  act  in  this  way  in 
anticipation of benefiting from the efforts of the others, none will invest in social control.
9 This 
phenomenon represents a major difficulty to any attempt to induce society to participate in social 
control  activities  in  the  real  world.  Therefore,  if  free  riding  opportunities were  included  in  the 
present model, the likelihood of a solution without spontaneous social involvement (t=0) would 
increase.  On  the  other  hand,  it  will  become  clear  in  the  next  section  that  the  benefit  sharing 
mechanism reduces the free riding effect since it offers a private personal gain to an agent that is 
instrumental in recovering diverted public resources.
10 
In conclusion, in spite of the fact that spontaneous social control is a feasible choice from a 
theoretical standpoint, one argues that society will tend to delegate all of the responsibility for 
government control to the official bodies. The next section presents an alternative mechanism, the 
basic purpose of which is to stimulate social control by means of an adequate incentives system, 
without imposing additional costs on the government. 
 
 
5. A Mechanism for Stimulating Civil Society's Participation in Social Control  
 
                                                            
9 This involves a phenomenon commonly witnessed in situations related to the voluntary provision of public goods, 
which results in the inadequate provision of those goods. In the current context, social control can be seen as a public 
good, given that its return reverts entirely to the benefit of society as a whole. 
10 The authors are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out the fundamental role of free riding. 14 
The Model with Incentives 
This section considers the case where the agent has no interest in investing a portion of his 
time in spontaneous social control. In other words, the solution to problem P2 is not interior, thereby 
requiring that t=0. The government recognizes the incentive problem and, realizing that it involves a 
typical  principal-agent  situation,  takes  the  role  of  a  principal  to  construct  a  mechanism  that 
motivates the agent to devote himself to social control. The mechanism works in the following 
manner:  if  the  agent  is  instrumental  in  recovering  the  diverted  public  resources  dB,  then  a 
percentage l of the resources will immediately revert to the agent himself, while the remaining 
percentage (1-l) is returned to the treasury. 
Therefore, this entails a risk-sharing partnership between the principal and the agent, insofar 
as the process of social control involves a cost to the agent (the opportunity cost of devoting his time 
to this activity) as well as risk: the possibility of failure (the agent not being able to detect the 
diversion,  the  probability  of  which  is  (1-  p(p0,t)).  To  stimulate  the  agent's  participation,  the 
government offers him a portion of the return should he succeed. Mechanisms of this nature are 
widely used both in theoretical models – and comprising the essence of the principal-agent model - 
and in practical situations. One of the more common and long-standing examples of this principle 
can  be  found  in  the  contracts  between  farmers  and  landowners,  in  which  the  landowner  (the 




The New Agent Problem  
  Given this new mechanism, the agent problem, P3(l), can be rewritten as follows. 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] b w t b w t l v c u t B c u t
l h
d p p p p p p g b p p ld p p a - - - + + + + - + + 1 , 1 , , 1 , 0 0 0 0 0 0
, max  
s.t.   h+l+t £ 1                    (11)   
                                                            
11 Adam Smith [1797] (2000) was one of the first researchers to analyze that sharecropping arrangement, a topic that 
still today inspires a significant quantity of theoretic and empirical research. For a recent reference, see Laffont & 
Martimort (2002). Next section presents a more precise comparison between the benefit sharing model and the basic 
moral hazard models.  15 
    c £ sh                      (12) 
 
In the expression above, The term c+ldB corresponds to the increase in the consumption the 
agent will merit if he is instrumental in the recovery of the diverted resources, the probability of 
which is p(p0,t). The solution t(l) for this new problem, which depends wholly on the parameter l, 
is analyzed below. 
 
Analysis of the Solution 
  The agent's objective-function can be rewritten as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] b w t b w t c u B c u t l v c u d p p p p p p g ld p ap b a - + - - + + + + - + + + + 1 1 0 0 0 0 0  
 
  In comparison to the objective function of problem P1, the following extra term appears: 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] c u B c u t - + + ld p ap 0 . In order to analyze the effect of this term on the agent's decision, the 
expression is broken down into two parts:  ( ) t , 0 p ap  and  ( ) ( ) c u B c u - + ld . 
Because  the  utility  function  u  is  strictly  increasing,  the  expression  ( ) ( ) c u B c u - + ld   is 
positive. In addition, since the parameter B corresponds to the total amount of the public budget, the 
term ldB is potentially very large if compared to the agent’s income c. Thus, the net gains in the 
utility of the agent who receives financial compensation,  ( ) ( ) c u B c u - + ld , is potentially high and 
will be even more substantial as the parameters d and l become larger. 
However, to make use of the expected gain in utility it is necessary that p(p0, t)>0, or, in 
other words, that t>0, i.e., that the agent devote some of his time to social control. 
Comparing to the situation in which the agent invests nothing in social control, one can 
conclude from the continuity of the utility functions u and v that a small reduction in h or in l  
(which makes t=1-h-l positive) will only slightly alter the values of u(c)=u(sh) and v(l). However, 
it will significantly alter the value of  ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] c u B c u t - + ld p ap , 0 , which increases from zero (t=0) 16 
to a large positive value. Thus, we can conclude on the basis of the continuity of the functions 
involved that the problem will more likely have an interior solution, that is, t>0. 
Therefore,  the  proposed  mechanism  will  stimulate  the  agent  to invest  his  time  in  social 
control.  The  topic  below  shows  that  the  proposed  mechanism  will  also  be  of  interest  to  the 
government. 
 
The Government Problem  
The proposed model stimulates the representative agent to invest a portion of his time in 
social control activities. Consequently, the probability of recovering the diverted resources increases 
from p0 to p0+p(p0, t).  
Consider now the government. Given that its main role is to provide public goods, one may 
define its utility as the total quantity of public resources actually invested in public goods and 
services. Therefore, it is possible to make a formal comparison of the effect of the new mechanism 
on the government’s welfare. 
Start with a situation in which the agents have no incentive to invest in spontaneous social 
control. In that case t=0 and the government's utility is: 
U0=(1- d)B+p0dB 
The first term in the expression above corresponds to the amount applied to public goods 
when the diverted resources dB are not recovered, while the second sum corresponds to the value 
that is recovered by the official control institutions, the probability of which is p0. 
Consider  now  the  government  implements  the  mechanism,  wherein  lÎ(0,1)  is  the 
apportionment parameter. Furthermore, let t(l) be the time the agent allocates to social control, 
given the parameter l. The government's utility then becomes: 
Ul=(1- d)B+[p0+(1- l)p(p0, t(l))]dB 
The difference between Ul and U0, the term (1- l)p (p0, t(l))dB, corresponds to the increase 
in the provision of public goods and services originating in the recovery of the diverted resources 
arising from the agent's efforts; given that the incremental probability of this recovery is p (p0, t(l)) 
and that it is subject to the apportionment l, one arrives at the expression above. 17 
  One can thus establish that the proposed mechanism leads to an increase in the total expected 
value of public investment, increasing, in this way, the government's utility, provided that t(l)>0. 
Note that the incentive is implemented at no cost to the government, since the payment is made 
through the use of resources that would not be available had they not been recovered with the 
agent's participation. 
  Also note that the gain occurs for any value of l, provided that: 
(i)   The parameter l is sufficiently high to ensure that t(l)>0; and 
(i)  The parameter l is smaller than 1, because otherwise all of the recovered resources 
would be transferred to the private agent. 
Moreover,  the  smaller  that  l  is,  the  larger  the  government's  return  will  be.  Thus,  the 
government would prefer to choose a very small value for that parameter. On the other hand, if the 
value were too low, the agent will invest little time in social control, thus reducing the probability 
p(t(l)). Consequently, the government problem can be written, using the principal-agent structure, 
as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]B t B l p p l p d
l
, 1 1 0 0 max - + + -   P4 




  The formulation presented above expresses the fact that the government will choose the 
factor l when it knows that, for each value of l, the agent will solve his maximization problem 
P3(l), thereby producing the choice t(l). For example, on the basis of the earlier discussion, if l=0 
then t(l)=0, but if l >0 then t(l)>0. 
Note  that,  in  equilibrium,  the  government  will  obtain  the  highest  possible  return  when 
choosing the value l  that induces an optimal participation of society in the control process. Also 
note that the government problem can be viewed as a typical moral hazard problem in which there 
are two possible states of nature (state 1: the diverted resources are recovered, state 2: they are not 
recovered)  and  the  likelihood  of  each  state  depends  on  the  costly  effort  t  of  the  agent  (the 18 
probabilities  ( ) t , 0 p p   for  recovery,  and  1- ( ) t , 0 p p   for  no  recovery).  The  restriction 
( ) ( ) l l 3 max arg P t
t
Î   can be viewed both as a participation constraint (the agent participates if 
t(l)>0) and an incentive compatibility constraint that induces the agent to choose the effort level t 
that maximizes the government’s utility function. 
 
 
6. Legislative oversight: police patrols, fire alarms and benefit sharing 
 
  One  of  the  central  elements  of  research  in  the  Executive-Legislative  relations  is 
Congressional  oversight,  defined  in  Ogul  and  Rockman  (1990)  as  “legislative  supervision  and 
monitoring  of  the  executive”.  The  earlier  literature  suggested  that  Congress  in  the  U.S.  was 
neglecting  its  oversight  responsibility  by  not  spending  enough  effort  to  oversee  administrative 
compliance with legislative goals
12. However, McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) argue that what 
appears to be neglect really reflects a preference for a more effective form of oversight over a less 
effective one.  
  According to the authors, the earlier literature focused on a form of control called police-
patrol oversight in which “Congress examines a sample of executive-agency activities, with the aim 
of detecting and remedying any violations of legislative goals”. 
  The authors suggest, however, that the literature is missing a second important method called 
fire-alarm oversight in which “Congress establishes a system of rules, procedures, and informal 
practices that enable individual citizens and organized interest groups to examine administrative 
decisions, to charge executive agencies with violating congressional goals, and to seek remedies 
from agencies, courts, and Congress itself”.  
This second method has three main advantages over the first one. First, it focuses Congress’ 
efforts in the problems that really matter to the constituents that have set the alarm. In the authors’ 
words: “Justly or unjustly, time spent putting out visible fires gains one more credit than the same 
time spent sniffing for smoke”. 19 
Second, since under a police-patrol policy only a small fraction of executive-branch actions 
can be monitored, that method is likely to miss violations that harm a congressman’s potential 
supporter. Finally, under a fire-alarm policy, “much of the cost is borne by the citizens and interest 
groups who sound the alarms and by the administrative agencies and courts”.  
The  basic  conclusion  of  McCubbins  and  Schwartz  (1984)  is  that  Congress  chooses  a 
potentially  more  efficient  but  reactive  oversight  policy  (the  fire-alarm  method)  rather  than  a 
potentially costlier and less efficient proactive oversight policy (the police-patrol method).  
In spite of the elegance of the treatment, theoretical and empirical works have not been 
conclusive in validating the fire-alarm policy approach
13. One of the reasons of interest for the 
present article is precisely the fact that “much of the cost is borne by the citizens and interest groups 
who sound the alarms”. Indeed, the alarm will only be sounded if the citizens placing the complaints 
find  that  redressing  the  situation  compensates  the  incurred  costs.  Although  the  focus  of  the 
legislative oversight is to prevent the Executive from changing policy from its original legislative 
intent
14,  one  may  argue  that  corruption  is  one  particular  way  to  change  a  policy  at  the 
implementation stage that hurts the politicians’ constituencies. In the case of corruption, the gains of 
recovering diverted resources may be so much diluted in society, that a cost-benefit analysis will 
lead citizens not to sound the alarm, as it has been shown earlier in this study.  
Therefore,  one  can  view  the  benefit-sharing  mechanism  as  a  complement  to  the 
implementation of the fire-alarm policy in the specific case of controlling wasteful use of public 
resources. In other words, the benefit-sharing mechanism may contribute to making the fire-alarm 
policy  more  effective,  by  aligning  the  incentives  of  those  who  may  sound  the  alarm  and  the 
oversight institution. As a consequence, with the new mechanism one may expect that a much wider 
group of citizens will accept to bear the costs associated with that policy. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
12 See the vast literature cited in McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984. 
13 See, for example, Balla (1998) for a discussion on the reasons why reactive oversight may be limited in its ability to 
enhance political control.  
14 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out that the scope of fire alarms in much wider than controlling 
corruption. 20 
7. Related Mechanisms in Theory and Practice 
 
  In spite of the originality of the proposed mechanism, which requires sharing with civil 
society the benefits of the recovered resources, the ideas of the present model can be related to 
mechanisms that are already being used in several countries or that have been proposed in the 
literature. 
  In the case of private firms’ collusion, a most important mechanism concerns the leniency 
programs that allow agreements between the government and a company involved in cartel activities 
with other firms. Leniency legislation started in the USA in 1978 and had its scope greatly extended 
in 1993. Since then, other countries have passed leniency laws such as the European Union in 1996, 
Korea in 1997, England, Germany, Canada and Brazil in 2000. The leniency agreements have the 
following basic characteristics. When the government suspects that companies are involved in cartel 
activities it can sign a contract with one of the firms involved that reduces or even eliminates all 
applicable fines and other legal charges to the firm that cooperates with the investigation.
15 The 
leniency laws have resulted in impressive numbers both in terms of the punishments and in terms of 
the  amounts  of  the  fines.  To  cite  two  illustrative  examples,  the  Antitrust  Division  of  the  U.S. 
Department of Justice has collected over 1.1 billion dollars in fines in fiscal year 1999; moreover, 
the  famous  case  of  the  vitamin  cartel,  where  Rhöne-Poulenc  cooperated  with  justice  signing  a 
leniency  agreement,  resulted  in  the  incarceration  for  five  months  of  the  President  of  Hoffman-
LaRoche, a Swiss resident in addition to a personal fine of 150 thousand dollars.
16 
  Therefore, leniency contracts seem to be an effective mechanism that creates incentives for 
companies involved in cartel activities to come forward in exchange for amnesty of its own liability. 
It is noteworthy that, to avoid abuses, the law states that a company shall not be the leader in the 
organization of the cartel in order to be able to sign a leniency agreement. Moreover, only the first 
company to come forward is entitled to amnesty under most leniency laws.  
                                                            
15 For the American case see Paul (200) or Lectric Law Library (08/10/1994). For a comparison between the American 
and the European Community leniency laws, see Feess & Walzl (2003). For the Brazilian case see Considera et al. 
(2001). 
16 See Paul (2000). 21 
If one compares the leniency legislation with the benefit sharing mechanism proposed here, 
it becomes clear that the former is more demanding on the part of government in the sense that it 
gives amnesty to a company involved in unlawful activities, whereas the latter only rewards those 
who are instrumental in recovering diverted public resources. 
  When it comes to incentives within the public administration, the Revenue System usually 
have the most sophisticated mechanisms. When an auditor fines a company for tax evasion part of 
the fine reverts to himself as a mechanism for avoiding collusion between evader and auditor.
17 That 
mechanism brings an additional benefit to the auditor that compensates him for the opportunity cost 
of  his  dedicated  and  uncorrupted  work,  just  as  the  shared  benefit  compensates  society  for  the 
opportunity cost of the time spent in social control. In addition, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service 
rewards citizens who provide significant information on tax fraud by giving them a percentage of 
the total tax recovered, usually 10%
18. The following table from Cooter & Garoupa (2001) presents 
some evidence on the amounts recovered due to that mechanism. 
 
         Table 1: Claims for reward filed and allowed (IRS Informants) 
Year  Number of Claims 
Filed  
Number  of  Claims 
Allowed in Full or in 
Part 
Percentage  Allowed 
in Full or in Part 
Taxes Recovered as 
Result of Informant 
Information (US$) 
1989  11,754  519  4.42%  72,030,630 
1990  10,757  635  5.90%  126,619,786 
1991  9,907  732  7.39%  58,370,096 
1992  10,966  671  6.12%  83,710,270 
1993  11,393  829  7.28%  172,072,960 
1994  9,063  669  7.38%  586,605,110 
1995  7,996  681  8.52%  96,435,097 
1996  9,430  650  6.89%  102,676,478 
1997  7,152  187  2.61%  68,417,053 
1998  6,687  737  11.02%  83,871,049 
TOTAL  95,105  6,310  6.63%  1,450,808,529 
         Source: Cooter & Garoupa (2001) 
 
    Still  in  the  realm  of  tax  evasion.  a  more  radical  mechanism  has  been  recently 
proposed in the literature. The mechanism tells a company that has corrupted an auditor that she can 
come forward and its tax evasion will be forgiven. In fact the corrupted auditor shall be liable for 
                                                            
17 See, for example, Besley & MacLaren (1993). 22 
that evasion and will be jailed in case he cannot compensate the government for that lost revenue. 
According to the author of the proposal, the mechanism is equivalent to sending to all companies the 
following letter
19. 
 “Dear Evader: 
If you did not pay your taxes and were discovered by an auditor, TRY TO  
CORRUPT HIM BY PAYING HIM A BRIBE, and then come to us, confess your evasion 
and report the corruption. By doing so you will help us to catch corrupt auditors and in 
return we will transfer the obligation of your present and past taxes and fines to them. 
Help us to catch corrupt auditors and we will forgive your evasion.” 
 
Finally, one implementation that is very close to our theoretic mechanism is the so called 
“qui  tam”  status  in  the  U.S.,  which  allows  private  citizens  “to  sue  on  behalf  of  the  federal 
government in cases involving false claims on the Unites States”
20. The term is a short for the 
original Latin sentence “qui tam pro domino rege quam pro sic ipso in hoc parte sequitur", which 
means “who as well for the king as for himself sues in this matter”. The status has its origin in 
medieval English practices and was first implemented in the U.S. as the False Claims Act of 1863, 
which was later strengthened in 1986. Under the 1986 legislation, a plaintiff suing on behalf of the 
government can receive between 15 and 25 percent of the recovery when the government decides to 
intervene or between 25 and 35 percent of the recovery without government intervention.
21 The 
table bellow, also from Cooter & Garoupa (2001), shows how the strengthened legislation has been 
effective in inducing citizens to invest their effort in recovering government money, as predicted in 
our theoretical analysis. 
 
  The  short  review  presented  here  shows  that  there  exists  a  rich  literature  with  various 
mechanisms that are already in use in order to induce agents to cooperate with the government’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
18 See Cooter & Garoupa (2001).  
19 Ordoñez (2002). 
20 The discussion presented here is based on Cooter & Garoupa (2001). 23 
effort to control damaging behavior to society. However, the existing mechanisms are only used in 
very specific situations. The main message of the present article is that if only incentives are set 
properly, then private involvement can be used in large scale to fight wasteful use of public resources
22. 
 
                         Table 2: U.S. Treasury Recoveries from qui tam suits 
Fiscal 
Year 
Number of Suits  U.S. Treasury Recoveries 
(US$) 
1987  33  200,000 
1988  60  355,000 
1989  95  15,000,000 
1990  82  40,000,000 
1991  90  72,000,000 
1992  119  134,000,000 
1993  131  173,000,000 
1994  221  379,000,000 
1995  279  244,000,000 
1996  363  127,000,000 
1997  530  625,000,000 
1998  417  331,000,000 
1999  483  458,000,000 
TOTAL  2924  2,598,555,000 






The  formal  analysis  of  the  proposed  mechanism  highlights  the  government's  strategic 
opportunity to induce civil society to engage into the social control process, and, in this way, reduce 
the diversion of public resources. It is an inexpensive mechanism for the government that does not 
result  in  the  ex  ante  disbursement  of  any  resources,  since  disbursement  is  restricted  to  those 
situations in which diverted resources are recovered. 
  However, the implementation such a mechanism is clearly subject to a series of adjustments 
given  the  adverse  incentives  it  may  cause.  In  general,  care  should  be  taken  each  time  the 
government decides to exercise its role as a principal to induce society into adopting a specific 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
21 See Depoorter & De Mot (2004). 
22 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this comment. 24 
pattern  of  conduct.  For  purposes  of  the  particular  case  considered  in  this  study,  some  of  the 
difficulties that must be resolved to ensure the mechanism's success need to be pointed out. 
First, the concept of the agent's “instrumentality” in recovering the resources must be made 
clear.  Indeed,  there  is  an  unintended,  although  expected,  adverse  incentive  created  by  the  new 
mechanism: since there is a reward to exposing diverted public resources, agents may want to make 
irresponsible  claims  in  order  to  get  a  “piece  of  the  cake”
23.  A  mere  accusation  lacking  solid 
substantiation should not, even if later borne out, be sufficient to guarantee access to the recovered 
resources. A pre-established level of minimum requirements with respect to evidence and other 
legal instruments should be required to avoid an avalanche of baseless accusations or false claims. 
That problem is shared by other similar mechanisms, such as the leniency programs for which a firm 
can only receive the benefit “if the [government authority] does not already have enough evidence 
to secure the conviction of the corporation or individual at the time the agreement is proposed.”
24 
Second, law enforcement and the Judicial System must be prepared to impose the applicable 
penalties and execute the recovery of the diverted resources. It is essential that these institutions 
have considerable flexibility and act quickly in order to make sure that the share owed to the private 
agent is transferred to him, so that he feels genuinely stimulated to invest his time in social control.  
Third, precautions  should be taken to avoid  the  formation  of  coalitions between  official 
control  and  organized  civil  institutions,  whereby  the  public  sector  first  discovers  the  diverted 
resources but proceeds to pass the information on to non-governmental organizations in order to 
obtain, via rent seeking, part of the return that the latter entity is slated to receive. Conversely, the 
benefit  sharing  mechanism  should  be  carefully  designed  in  order  not  to  jeopardize  the  public 
authorities’ efforts. As Gunningham et al. (2004) put in the context of environment regulation, “[…]  
it is important that public interest groups should not be tempted to abuse their position as defender 
of social interest, that there should not be opportunities for excess or to override carefully devised 
regulatory compliance strategies”
25. 
                                                            
23 The authors are grateful to an anonymous referee for presenting the point in those terms. 
24 Considera et al. (2001). 
25 The authors are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out this additional difficulty of the proposed mechanism 
as well as the cited reference. 25 
These  are  complex  matters.  However,  they  are  typical  situations  that  occur  when  the 
government  decides  to  intervene  in  the  social  equilibrium.  Furthermore,  the  success  of  a  few 
specific  mechanisms  described  in  this  article,  in  particular  the  qui  tam  legislation  in  the  U.S., 
suggests  that  several  countries  have  been  able  to  circumvent  those  difficulties  is  very  specific 
situations. 
Considering the originality of the proposed mechanism, one can only speculate about its 
long-term  effects.  However,  it  seems  clear  that  there  will  be  some  specialization  of  the  non-
governmental institutions that devote themselves to social control, since experience and the presence 
of some form of professional structure will have the effect, potentially, of elevating the probability 
for success (the parameter k in the example) of such an institution. Thus, a great deal of competition 
can be expected initially, when many organizations will seek to obtain the resources associated with 
the recovery of diverted resources; however, this initial euphoria should give way to a subsequent 
stage marked by a balance among more specialized institutions. 
Another trend that be can expected is that as the probability that diverted resources will be 
detected increases - provided it is accompanied by rigorous penalties for those involved - corrupt 
individuals will feel more threatened and, consequently, the percentage d of diverted resources will 
tend to decrease. But then, the government will be maximizing the volume of resources it applies to 
public  goods  and  services  and,  by  the  same  token,  the  sums  shared  with  non-governmental 
organizations will reduce: the very fear of being exposed by a society highly involved in social 
control - in addition to regular government control - will serve as an important factor in inhibiting 
the diversion of resources (the d parameter in the model), further increasing the government's return 
on the implementation of such a mechanism. 
The extension of the model in order to endogenize the decision of how much to deviate and 
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